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RECENT CASES

PRODUCTS LIABILITY VERSUS
NEGLIGENCE-VERDICT
INCONSISTENCY AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
Rinker v. Ford Motor Co.1
While test driving a used 1969 Ford LTD automobile, Patricia Rinker
checked the car's acceleration by fully depressing the accelerator pedal.
The car's speed continued to increase when she lifted her foot from the
pedal, and the car could not be slowed with the brakes. With the car
traveling at about 70 m.p.h., Rinker approached a busy intersection,
where the cars in her lane were stopped for a light. To avoid colliding with
them, she turned the car left into a concrete median. Upon striking the
median, the LTD became airborne and struck a car in the intersection.
Rinker sustained severe injuries in the collision and sued Ford Motor
Company, who manufactured the automobile, and Bill Woods Ford, the
automobile dealer who arranged the test drive, in strict liability. She also
proceeded against Ford on a theory of negligent failure to warn. She alleged that the car's acceleration continued even after the gas pedal was released because the fast idle cam, a nylon part of the carburetor assembly, had
broken when the accelerator was pressed and had wedged against the fast
idle lever, holding open the throttle valves of the carburetor. At trial,
Rinker presented testimony that the nylon from which the cam was made
was likely to deteriorate when exposed to conditions under the hood of a
car. Further testimony indicated that the carburetor was so designed that
nothing prevented the fast idle cam from, if it broke, rotating into a position jamming the fast idle lever.
The jury returned a general verdict against Ford for $100,000 actual
damages and $460,000 punitive damages, whichwere authorized under
the negligent failure to warn submission. Defendant Bill Woods Ford, subject only to the strict liability submission, was exonerated. On Ford's appeal, the trial court's judgment was affirmed by the Kansas City district of
the Missouri Court of Appeals. The Rinker decision is significant in two
respects: an apparently inconsistent verdict was allowed to stand, and
punitive damages were, for the first time in Missouri, recovered in a products liability suit.
Ford argued on appeal that its motion for judgment n.o.v. should have
been sustained for verdict inconsistency. The basis of its contention was an
analysis of the verdict-directing instructions submitted. While this analysis
may indeed have pointed up a potential legal inconsistency in the resultant
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findings and verdict, the factual situation was such that logically this verdict could have reasonably been returned.
Ford argued that the return of a general verdict against it for both
compensatory and punitive damages was possible only under the negligent
failure to warn submission. This meant, Ford urged, that the jury must
have exonerated both defendant Bill Woods and Ford on the strict liability submission. The asserted verdict inconsistency was premised on Ford's
evaluation of the contents of the instructions. Ford concluded that the only
difference between the two verdict directors was the inclusion of the term
"defective" in the strict liability instruction, 2 since every other element
contained therein also appeared in the negligent failure to warn instruction.3 Ford's contention was that since the jury had failed to find for the
plaintiff on the strict liability theory, it must have been unconvinced that
the product was "defective." And if the jury could not satisfy itself as to the
"defective" nature of the vehicle a verdict against Ford on the negligent
failure to warn submission was precluded, since no duty to warn could
arise if the product was not defective.
In defense of its inconsistency argument, Ford adduced cases reversed
by Missouri courts for inconsistency in which the right to recover was
dependent upon, or derivative from, a prior finding. These included
respondeat superior actions and claims for personal injury and loss of consortium.
The Rinker court, however, summarily rejected Ford's contention that
the verdict holding Ford liable under the negligent failure to warn submission while apparently exonerating both defendants from strict liability was
inconsistent. It sustained the findings on the basis that the theories relied
on were "separate and distinct theories of liability."4 The court concluded
that where several such claims are joined for trial, "consistency among the
verdicts disposing of the several issues is not required." 5
A parallel case arising in California, Hasson v. Ford Motor Co.6 offers

an explanation for sustaining these apparently inconsistent findings. It
dealt with a used car's brake failure which allegedly resulted from heatinduced vaporization of the brake fluid. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that no defect in the vehicle existed at the time it
was manufactured by Ford, but that Ford, nevertheless, was negligent.
This express finding of lack of defect at the time of manufacture distinguishes the Hasson case from the noted case, as this finding could only
be surmised in Rinker. Ford advanced a similar argument in the Hasson
case as it did in Rinker that a finding of negligence depended on a finding
of defect. The California court, as in the instant case, found it unnecessary

2. Mo. APPROVED

INSTR. No. 25.04 (1969).

3. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 31.01 (1969).
4. 567 S.W.2d at 660.
5. Id. at 659 (citing Page v. Hamilton, 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1959)).
6. 19 Cal. 3d 530, 138 Cal. Rptr. 705, 564 P.2d 857 (1977).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/9

2

Lineberry: Lineberry: Products Liability versus Negligence

1979]

RECENT CASES

to pursue that reasoning and noted that evidence was adduced and instructions were submitted such that the jury could "choose either theory as
a self-sufficient basis of Ford's liability."'7 Further, the court concluded
that "there was no suggestion that failure to find one element of one theory
would preclude assessment of liability on the other."8
However, the California opinion is enlightening since it went on to
speculate as to the basis for the jury's findings Perhaps, the court reasoned, although the car was not "defective" at the time of manufacture, the
gradual deterioration of some of the component parts as a result of time
and use eventually rendered the vehicle dangerous, and Ford could
logically be held liable for its failure to warn of these potentialities. This
same reasoning could be applied to the Rinker case such that Ford could
be found negligent for failure to warn, especially considering evidence that
Ford had received prior notice9 of the cam's tendency to break and lodge
against the fast idle lever.
The problem in Rinker of a potential verdict inconsistency is a difficult
one. Ford's argument is, granted, logically seductive. How could the jury,
one might ask, arrive at the conclusion that Ford even had a
duty to warn if there were no defect inherent in the automobile? On the
other hand, the court's conclusion that the theories of liability were
separate and independent seems equally compelling, especially if the
Hasson reasoning is employed. The Rinker court noted that the jury requested a definition of the term "defective;" 10 this, considered with the
verdict returned, leads one to suspect that the jury felt the vehicle was fit
for its intended use at the time of manufacture but that with the passage of
time, the nylon's deterioration led to a defect that gave rise to a duty to
warn.
From the standpoint of legal theory, Ford's analysis of the instructions
and the relationship they bear to each other is sound. The Rinker case,
however, simply points up the difficulty of conforming relatively static jury
instructions to varying factual situations. The 1978 version of the Missouri
Approved Instructionsfor strict liability and negligent failure to warn are
vulnerable to this same possibility of asserted inconsistency, because just as
in the 1969 version used in Rinker, the 1978 strict liability instruction
employs the term of art "defective," while the corresponding negligent
failure to warn instruction 2 only requires that the article in question be
named and that its alleged hazard be described. Thus, given a similar set
of facts and an equally resourceful defendant, the situation could again
arise in which a defendant is seemingly held liable for negligent failure to
warn concerning a product with no "defect."
7.
8.
9.,
10.

Id. at 541, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 712, 564 P.2d at 864.
Id.
Fordreceived 29 reports over a period of four years. 567 S.W.2d at 663.
Id. at 659.
Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 25.04 (West Supp. 1978).

11.
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Rinker is the first products liability suit in Missouri in which punitive
damages have been recovered. 13The authorization for punitive damages,
however, was under a negligent failure to warn submission. Thus, while its
character as a products liability action makes it a first of sorts, the court
applied the same requirements for the punitive damages recovery as would
be used in any negligence suit. There are, however, other theories of
recovery subsumed under the appellation "products liability" in which an
award of punitive damages might seem to pose a more difficult
problem.
Ford attacked the punitive damages award 4 with the argument that
such an award is inappropriate in a products liability action. 15 The basis of
its contention was the contrast between the possible consequences of a suit
1
for damages for an intentional tort with those of a products liability suit. 6
In the former, there is usually but one victim who can bring suit and
recover punitive damages from the tortfeasor. In the instance of a defective mass-produced product, the manufacturer could conceivably be held
liable for punitive damages to a great number of injured consumers all
over the country.
Ford's argument was premised on the reasoning of Judge Friendly of
the Second Circuit in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,1 7 the case that
heralded the beginning of the modern era of punitive damages claims in
products liability litigation. Roginsky involved MER/29, a drug developed
13.

An earlier Missouri case that may have had precedential value as to the

question of recovery of punitive damages in a products liability suit was Crews v.
Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 240 Mo. App. 993, 225 S.W.2d 812 (Spr. 1949).
Although it was held that the evidence was insufficient to support an award of

punitive damages, the suit gives indication that Missouri could recognize the
validity of such an award. This is apparently the only Missouri case on the question to predate Rinker.
14. It should be pointed out that the term "products liability" does not

designate a theory of recovery, but is used to describe a suit in which a defect in
the design, material, or preparation of a product is alleged and where damages
are sought on a theory of negligence, 402A or warranty, for example. See generally Igoe, Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 34 J. Mo. BAR 394 (1978);
Owens, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1258 (1976); Comment, Allowance of Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability
Claims, 6 GA. L. REv. 613 (1972); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of
Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517 (1957); Comment, Punitive Damages in Products
Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA LAW. 895 (1976).
15. A similar argument is often made concerning the "anomaly" of any
award of punitive damages in a tort action, the contention being that it is not the
office of the civil law to punish. But as Professor Morris observed, in our faultbased system of tort liability, the reparative function of a tort judgment is coupled
with an admonitory one. If the defendant's past conduct is not deserving of
punishment, i.e., if he has not been guilty of negligence or intentional wrongdoing, then the injured plaintiff will ordinarily not receive monetary recompense.
Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Claims, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1931).
16. Brief for Appellant at 90.
17. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/9
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and marketed by the defendant designed to aid in the treatment of
arteriosclerosis, but causing harmful side effects. In the nationwide litigation which ensued from the marketing of this drug,18 there was evidence
that Richardson-Merrell had falsified data that had accompanied its new
drug application to the Federal Drug Administration and had withheld
important information concerning side effects such as cataracts, hair loss,
and ichthyosis. 19 The award of punitive damages in Roginsky was reversed
while the compensatory damages judgment was affirmed. One of the major concerns entertained by Judge Friendly in this influential opinion was
that a manufacturer who had not otherwise engaged in irresponsible
behavior could be driven into financial ruin-by an error in judgment concerning a single product, leading to numerous punitive damages claims. 20
When faced with Ford's reiteration of Judge Friendly's exposition of
this theoretical danger, the Rinker court pointed out that the punitive
damages award had been reversed in Roginsky not because such awards
are inappropriate in products liability suits but because the evidence was
insufficient to satisfy a technical requirement of New York law. Judge
Friendly's disapproval of awards of punitive damages in products liability
actions for policy reasons was dicta.
With the rejection of Ford's assertion and the affirmance of the
punitive damages judgment, Missouri is aligning itself with the growing
number of states which allow the recovery of punitive damages in products
liability suits. None of the state and federal courts which have considered
the question have found such awards to be incongruous with the principles
of products liability actions, although some have reversed punitive
damages awards where they have found the evidence of the defendant's
misconduct insufficient to warrant such an award. Of the reported cases,
26
5
24
California, 21 Hawaii, 22 Illinois, 23 New York, Ohio,2 and Tennessee
18. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass
Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116 (1968).
19. See Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., another MER/29 case, but one
in which the evidence characterized Richardson-Merrell's behavior in a way quite
opposed to the characterization inRoginsky. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689 at 695-702; 60
Cal. Rptr. 398 at 404-08 (1967).
20. 378 F.2d at 841.
21. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398 (1967).
22. See Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975), in
which defendant was ordered to answer interrogatories concerning financial
worth for punitive damages claim.
23. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969),
affd 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
24. Professor Owens, supra note 14 at 1327, n.333, refers to an unreported
case, Ostopowitz v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, col.
3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y.).
25. Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1976).
26. Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
Published
by University
of Missouri
School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
denied,
424 U.S.
913 (1976).
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have upheld on appeal punitive damages judgments in products liability
suits. Florida27 and Pennsylvania 28 have reported products liability cases in
which punitive damages awards have been reversed for insufficiency of
evidence as to the defendant's gross malfeasance.
The real question in the products liability arena seems not to be
whether punitive damages may be awarded in such actions at all, but
under which theories of recovery. In the Rinker suit, as mentioned, the
punitive damages award was assessed under the negligent failure to warn
theory. Awarding punitive damages under a negligence theory, even in a
products liability action, would seem to present little difficulty as far as
assimilation into our present torts system. If the tortfeasor's behavior is
deemed sufficiently egregious, punitive damages can be recovered for
gross negligence.
The more difficult situation is a request for compensatory and punitive
damages under a warranty or a strict liability submission. If an action is
brought in warranty, there are two obstacles to recovery of punitive
damages: the rule in contract actions that no punitive damages may be
awarded because of the need for certainty of liability in commercial transactions, and the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs most warranty
claims. Section 1-106(1) provides that "[t]he remedies provided by this Act
shall be liberally administered... but neither consequential or special nor
penal damages may be had exc6pt as specifically provided in this Act or by
other rule of law." The official comment to this section states that the section is included "to make it clear that compensatory damages are limited
to compensation. They do not include consequential or special damages,
or penal damages... ." Because of this provision, it seems that recovery of
punitive damages would be precluded in a warranty action controlled by
29
the Code.
Finally, there is the situation in which compensatory and punitive
damages are requested under a strict liability submission. At first, this
combination seems logically impossible because of the apparent incompatibility between the no-fault nature of strict liability and the recldessness
or wantonness of the behavior requisite to support a punitive damages
claim. However, as Professor Owens points out, the incompatibility argument is premised upon the erroneous assumption that the proof required
to establish the punitive damages claim is the same as that required to
substantiate the strict liability claim.30 This is not true. Instead, it is acceptable to establish the strict liability claim and then, by additional proof, the
27.

E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).

28. Thomas v. American Cyst. Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
29. For a good discussion of punitive damages claims in warranty actions,
see Owens, supra note 14, at 1271.
30. Id. at 1268.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/9
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punitive damages claim of aggravated fault. This was the reasoning pursued by the Wisconsin federal court in Drake v.Wham- 0 Manufacturing
Co. ,3' the first suit to combine a strict liability count with one for punitive
damages. The court held that although the proof required to make out a
strict liability claim would be insufficient to justify punitive damages, the
plaintiff had also alleged a wanton disregard for the safety and well-being
of the deceased by the defendant, and that evidence to support that claim
would justify a punitive damages award. 32 The most recent cases addressing this question are Hell Co. v. Grant,33 and Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp. ,4a crashworthiness case. The federal court in the Maxey case dealt
with the question of a punitive damages claim accompanying a strict
liability submission by noting that the two are independent concepts with
different purposes:
The purpose of one is compensation and the purpose of the other is
deterrence. The focus of one is redistribution of loss and the focus
of the other is punishment. They are related to the extent that actual injury must support an exemplary award and to the extent
that some cases suggest that there must be a relationship between
the amounts of actual and exemplary damages. 35
The court then stated that the federal rules allow the "simultaneous
6
presentation of single claims upon different theories, 3,,and
that this combination is essentially a matter "of trial efficiency and presents no true
37
substantive issues."
The most important consideration remaining unresolved is the level of
malfeasance that the defendant's behavior must reach before punitive
damages will be appropriate in strict liability or, possibly, warranty actions. In Missouri, punitive damages are imposed where the defendant has
displayed outrageous misconduct. As the court stated in Warner v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. :38
The acts of the defendant which will justify the imposition of
punitive damages are those which are willful, wanton, malicious
or so reckless as to be in utter disregard of the consequences. Such
31. 373 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
32. However, the Drake case was strongly criticized two years later by the
same court in Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976). The
Walbrun court based its disapproval on the fact that in Wisconsin punitive
damages may be recovered not for gross negligence but only for intentional torts.
Thus, although there may have been evidence of wanton, willful, or reckless
disregard of the plaintiffs rights, a punitive damages award would be improper.
33. 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (wrongful death suit; dicta that
exemplary damages are recoverable under a strict liability theory for defective
design and failure to warn).
34. 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
35. Id. at 961.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 962.
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acts are clearly distinguished from negligence. While they need
not always include an intent to do harm, they must show such a
conscious disregard for another's
rights 'as to amount to willful
39
and intentional wrongdoing.'

In Rinker the jury returned a verdict against Ford for punitive
damages, based on Missouri Approved Jury Instruction 10.02. That instruction required that the jury find that Ford's conduct showed "complete
indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of other. 40° In Evans v.
Illinois Central Railway Co., 4 1 the court discussed the meaning of these

terms:
A wanton act is a wrongful act done on purpose, or in malicious
disregard of the rights of others. Recklessness is an indifference to
the rights of others and an indifference whether wrong or injury is
done or not. As we understand the words 'conscious disregard for
the life and bodily safety,' they add nothing to the words 'Willful,
wanton and reckless' and are included within the meaning of those
words. As applied to an act, they necessarily mean that such act
was intentionally done without regard to the rights42 of others, and
in full realization of the probable results thereof.
43
The Rinker court used the case of Reel v. ConsolidatedInventory Co.
to illustrate the "nature of conduct which may be found to amount to conscious disregard of the safety of others." 44 Reel was a negligence suit in
which punitive damages were assessed. 45 It involved an owner of a building
who, after having been notified by city inspectors of a worn elevator cable,
had taken no action for six weeks. The cable broke while the plaintiff was
in the elevator, causing him to sustain severe injuries. The court said that
the owner's failure to replace the cables during the six-week period "was
not, and under the circumstances could not have been, the result of mere
inadvertence, but of an utter indifference to the rights of those whose lives
and limbs were thereby daily and hourly imperiled, equivalent to intentional wrongdoing.1

46

The Rinker court analogized the behavior of Ford to that of the defendant in Reel. Ford had received twenty-nine reports of cam breakage during a four-year period yet had remained inactive. It was concluded that on
the evidence the jury could have found Ford guilty of conscious disregard
of the safety of all of those people who could be endangered by a Ford auto
with cam failure.
39.

Id. at 603.

40.

Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 10.02 (1969).

41. 289 Mo. 493, 233 S.W. 397 (En Banc 1921).
42. Id. at 503, 233 S.W. at 400.
43. 236 S.W. 43 (Mo. 1921).
44. 567 S.W.2d at 668.
45. The judgment was reversed becauge of an error in the punitive damages
instruction. 236 S.W. at 47.
46. Id. at 46.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss3/9
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